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Abstract
It is widely recognised that a number of segments of social life in advanced
industrial societies are ’self-policing’ without the constant intervention of gov-
ernment, because one actor can only succeed at the expense of one or more
other actors, whose interest therefore lies in keeping the first in check. Economic
doctrines of the market, constitutional doctrines of checks and balances, and
the practices of industrial relations, all enshrine this understanding. It is not
so widely appreciated, however, that governments frequently achieve policy
aims by intervening in such self-balancing processes, so as to aid one combatant
or handicap another, and since this quite commonplace policy instrument does
not appear to have a generic name, the author calls it ’collibration’. The paper
gives a large number of illustrations of this technique in use, in the traditional
arenas just mentioned, and suggests that in the contemporary politics of policy
and issue networking, and in the more egalitarian culture the advanced indus-
trial societies may be entering, the advantages of collibration over conventional
instruments will become apparent.
* * * * *
Weithin ist bekannt, daß in modernen Industriegesellschaften eine Reihe von
gesellschaftlichen Bereichen der "Selbststeuerung" (self-policing) ohne ständige
staatliche Intervention unterliegen, weil ein Akteur Vorteile nur auf Kosten
anderer erzielen kann, deren Interesse deshalb ist, ersteren unter Kontrolle zu
halten. In ökonomischen Modellen des Marktes, konstitutionellen Modellen
gegenseitiger Kontrolle und daraus resultierenden Gleichgewichten wie auch
in der Praxis industrieller Beziehungen sind solche Vorstellungen zu finden.
Weniger Aufmerksamkeit wird jedoch der Tatsache geschenkt, daß staatliche
Institutionen häufig Politikziele erreichen, indem sie in solche selbst-steuernden
Prozesse eingreifen, um einem Akteur zu helfen oder einem anderen Beschrän-
kungen aufzuerlegen; da dieses durchaus übliche Politikinstrument offensicht-
lich noch keinen Fachausdruck hat, sei es hier "collibration" genannt. Im Discus-
sion Paper werden eine Vielzahl von Anwendungsbeispielen in den obenge-
nannten Bereichen für diese Interventionsmethode beschrieben, und es wird
die Vermutung angestellt, daß in den gegenwärtigen politischen Auseinander-
setzungen um die Ausgestaltung und Koordination von themen- und pro-
grammbezogenen Netzwerken sowie innerhalb einer sich in entwickelten Indu-
striegesellschaften möglicherweise herausbildenden egalitären Kultur die Vor-
teile des Interventionsinstruments "collibration" gegenüber den konventionellen
Interventionsmethoden sichtbar hervortreten werden.
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to a form of government inter-
vention that is in widespread use and yet does not correspond to any of the
conventional "tools of government" or "policy instruments" (Mayntz 1980, 1983;
Kaufmann/ Rosewitz 1983; Hood 1983; Daintith 1988; Salamon 1989). It is his-
torically well-recognised that a great deal of self-governance, or self-policing
without the intervention of government, is maintained by social processes
where one group of people habitually and almost necessarily check and balance
whatever another group of people is trying to do: as in the classical "market",
but also in the never-ending tug-of-war between employers and workers, per-
haps in the built-in conflict of interest between politicians and the media, and
in countless less-institutionalised situations. A government sensitive to the
dynamics of such social processes can without imperilling the social governance
produced "tip the scales" a little to serve specific policy ends.
In the battle against pollution, "make the polluters pay" is one strategy, involv-
ing a degree of investigation and enforcement; another, already employed in
several countries in regard to unleaded motor fuel, is by adjusting tax rates to
inveigle the consumer into freely choosing products which further the govern-
ment’s aim rather than those which do not. In the fight for food safety, govern-
ments can inspect stocks and condemn unfit material; another method is to
require food packagers to print indications of shelf-life on the product and
strengthen the ability of the customer to "make a rational choice". In industrial
relations, a government concerned about the social and economic effects of
strikes can outlaw them, and thus destroy the self-governance, or it can enable
employers to recover damages from trade unions in respect of a strike not
preceded by a majority vote of members in a secret ballot. This kind of govern-
ment intervention in someone else’s struggle for its own purposes is, as these
examples perhaps show, quite commonplace and yet it does not have a generic
name that I know of.
The principle of reaping benefit from others’ conflicts is very ancient. It is ex-
plicit in ancient maxims of statecraft and colonialism like "divide and rule", and
in judiciously shifting one’s alliances to keep the "balance of power" in interna-
tional relations. It is implicit in activities of the kind Shakespeare personified
in Iago: skilled manipulators have always known how to tip a balance with
a word in the right ear, or how to set enemies at each other’s throats so as to
slip something through while attention is distracted. But the principle needs
to be freed from these Macchiavellian connotations.
Philosophically the idea rests upon a particular theory of society, that societal
stability is not only autonomous and largely independent of government action
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but is also a function of internal conflict of interest, or competition. This is a
theory embryonic in Adam Smith’s "hidden hand", and Herbert Spencer’s view
of the market as Nature’s equivalent at the social level of the "survival of the
fittest" mechanism of evolution, which would only work if left alone. The theo-
ry is developed in the sociological classics of Georg Simmel (1908, 1955) and
the American E.A. Ross (1910, 1920), the former showing how social conflicts
and antagonisms (including competition in the marketplace) have strong "so-
ciative" as well as their obvious fissiparous properties, the latter demonstrating
that, the more antagonisms there are, cross-cutting in many directions, the less
likely is a society to split along any one cleavage, "so that one might say that
society is sewn together by its inner conflicts" (Ross 1920: 165; quoted in Coser
1956: 74). Growing functional differentiation in a society, greater specialization,
is necessarily accompanied by conflict of interest, but also by interdependence,
which constructs a fabric or linkage at once vulnerable and resilient: it is rather
easily ruptured, but knits itself up again.
Market mechanisms, as Polanyi pointed out (1951: 162-167), fall into a wider
category of social processes by which frictions among people and groups are
eased by spontaneous mutual adjustment. But not all social processes are "fric-
tion-easing". Even among market mechanisms, some are lenitive, but others
aggravate conflict. Competitive bargaining (the seller-buyer relation ending in
a "trade") was for Weber indeed a "reconciliation" (Interessenausgleich) of op-
posed but complementary interests (1968: 41), each side needing the other. But
competitive emulation, aiming at rising relatively in some kind of league-table,
can be friendly or deeply hostile; rivalry, the separate pursuit of the same prize,
or the seller-seller relationship, can be quite non-antagonistic or it can be "cut-
throat", satisfied by nothing less than the elimination of the rival.
Mayntz and Nedelman (1987) identify a number of social processes which, once
started, continue and intensify of their own momentum - eigendynamic social
processes. Some of these, like the pursuit of fashion, are driven by a recursive
oscillation between incompatible objectives (novelty and emulation, assertive-
ness and conformity), or as in three-cornered "king and barons" situations, are
kept going by shifts from competitive to cooperative relations between two of
the actors according to the dispositions of the third; or as in Crozier’s model
of bureaucracy, lurch between extremes for lack of ability to change piecemeal.
Such processes we can call compensatory, because by however complex a chain
of effects, any tendency for the process to move towards resolution in one
direction engenders a contrary tendency of comparable strength towards resolu-
tion in the other direction, and so on ad infinitum unless interrupted from with-
out.
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Other eigendynamic social processes are different: once begun, each interaction
intensifies the original conflict so that the process escalates, as in the "vicious
circle" of the arms race, or a blood feud, or the downward spiral of events that
ends in bankruptcy, or "weakest to the wall" competition. Any tendency for
the process to move towards resolution in one direction is opposed by no con-
trary tendency, or none that is strong enough, and exacerbates itself on each
iteration. Such processes we can call reinforcing. Sociologists have isolated other
types of recursive and non-recursive social process, such as the "dirty cycles"
of academic production (Titze 1984), migration processes (Czada/ Windhoff-
Héritier 1991: 10), emergence and schism processes, diffusion and mobilisation
processes, and a host of other social phenomena which do not necessarily fall
into either of these categories, but are not yet brought together in a catalogue
raisonné.
What we can say here is twofold: one, as between these two categories, the kind
of government intervention we are discussing is relevant only to compensatory
processes; and two, all such social processes are isolable only analytically. In
any real society, social processes of all kinds interact with one another, interfere
with one another, negate or reinforce one another, so that the identity of any
discerned process becomes lost in the social flux - which is perhaps a version
of Simmel’s warning to us not to take our analytic hindsights for true descrip-
tion (Simmel 1955: 21).
In political science the doctrines of pluralism map on to the Simmel/ Ross
account of societal stability. There it is precisely the equal value of all political
goals, the absence of any overriding principle, the rights of all to form groups
to pursue their own interests, that produces political stability. From time to
time, some political actor or coalition may accumulate power, but no one indi-
vidual, group or coalition will dominate for long, since that will create a tempo-
rary common purpose among a number of other actors, wishing to restore a
more opportune situation where currently blocked interests can again be pur-
sued. The most well-known doctrine of this kind is probably Lindblom’s "mutu-
al partisan adjustment" (1965).
But a more vigorous tradition goes back to Spinoza’s ideas for harnessing ambi-
tion and turning natural conflict to the common benefit: "Men should be gov-
erned in such a way that they do not regard themselves as being governed,
but as following their own bent and their own free choice ..." (Spinoza 1677,
vol X.8; 1958: 435-437). So army officers would not be paid, so that they had
an incentive to win the spoils of battle, but senators would seek peace, because
they were paid from duties on imports and exports. Other ideas of a "natural"
tension being utilised to produce stability were the seventeenth century doc-
trines of the "balanced constitution" (Vile 1967: 67), Montesquieu’s "separation
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of powers" (1748), and Madison’s "ambition must be made to counter ambition"
(Federalist Papers No 51, [1788] 1961: 322), coming forward to Allison’s "ad-
versarial bureaucracies" (1971).
For Hobbes the "balance of power" between sovereigns was such a natural
process; but by the nineteenth century it had come to be seen as a goal of poli-
cy, to be brought about by shifting allegiance (Wight 1979). Aristotle had had
the same idea, of the possibility of managing a balance:
It is plain, then, that the most perfect political community must be among those
who are in the middle rank, and those states are best instituted wherein these
are a larger and more respectable part, if possible, than both the other [higher
and lower] ranks; or, if that cannot be, at least than either of these separate; so
that being thrown into the balance it may prevent either scale from preponderat-
ing (Politics Bk IV chap XI: 1295b).
Political pluralism perhaps leans towards the "natural" in accounting for the
stabilising effect of the interlocking of interests in contention, so long as the
system is left alone. But there are many critiques of political pluralism. Many
social-democratic platforms are built on a view that the modern social system
is not self-righting, that if left alone its processes tend towards concentrations
of power or wealth or status, and that it needs to be rigorously managed in
the interests of an equitable distribution of social goods. Marxist approaches
begin from the position that concentrations of power deriving from market
processes are protected by bourgeois governments’ use of law and state machin-
ery to deal with any threat to the stable working of economic structures.
Olson (1982; quoted in Czada 1991: 259) found the rapid growth of single-pur-
pose political groups in the 1960s and 1970s a source of social rigidity - a down-
ward spiral of social closure, as "monopoly" groups squeeze out spontaneity.
The doctrines of "self-reference" and autopoiesis (Teubner/ Willke 1984; Luh-
mann 1986) see social structures as less and less penetrable, by government or
each other. If government cannot for lack of access or expertise or other reason
regulate such social subsystems, it might at least make them regulate them-
selves in acceptable ways - through "decentralized context governance" or "re-
flexive law" (Teubner/ Willke 1980, 1984), which would govern their internal
working through procedural checks and balances - a concept with affinities to
what is being discussed here.
Schmitter sees the growth of large formal associations "intermediating" interests
between civil society and the state as the condition of governability:
Polities in which interests are processed through formal associations that cover
the widest variety of potential interests with national networks of representation,
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that have the highest proportion of those potentially affected as members, and
whose pattern of interaction with the state is monopolistic, specialized, hierarchi-
cal, and mutually collusive should be more orderly, stable, and effective, at least
in the short run, given the conditions of contemporary governance. Put a differ-
ent way, those countries previously ’fortunate’ enough to have developed a
pluralist mode of interest intermediation with its multiple, overlapping, spontane-
ously formed, voluntaristically supported, easily abandoned, and politically
autonomous associations, are likely to find it a serious impediment to governabil-
ity in the post-liberal, advanced capitalist state (Schmitter 1986: 292-293).
My gloss on this would be that the governability arises not only because of the
collusion but because of the rivalry among associations - they would not come
into being except as a defensive measure - which government can exploit.
Mayntz makes the point that the self-regulability of large institutions can be
a net asset to the state:
With the institutional consolidation of social subsystems, and especially with
the emergence of multi-level structures including actors of a higher order (organi-
zations, umbrella organizations, associations, peak associations etc.), their ability
of self-regulation or at least self-organization increases. The superior action capac-
ity of powerful and articulate corporate actors means that the negative exter-
nalities and threatening aggregate effects which are unavoidable in complex
systems, are not only recognized by those negatively affected, but countermea-
sures can be initiated. Understood in this way, self-organization and the capacity
for horizontal coordination with other similarly organized societal subsystems
should not necessarily diminish political governability, but, quite on the contrary,
could enhance it (Mayntz 1993: 17-18).
The question of governability is not one of "either government, or else anarchy".
On the one hand, a modern society of cross-cutting conflict processes is self-
stabilising without the continual intervention of government. Except in circum-
stances of overwhelming turbulence, system persistence is much more likely
than system collapse even though government at any moment can be paying
attention to only an infinitesimal fraction of it. On the other hand, there is no
reason to believe that the particular configuration of social forces that obtains
at any moment is the most desirable one or must be the best obtainable. If a
dynamic social system is not exploding or collapsing, then by definition it is
in some sort of balance: but such a position certainly does not represent a
homoeostatic equilibrium to which the system will return if left alone, nor is
it in any sense the best of all possible worlds. It is the transient stability of near-
equal forces in multiple cross-tensions, the point of equilibrium never in the
same place for long, yet (because of the criss-crossing) never very far away.
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Maybe the appropriate description of this situation is that known in the chaos
theory literature as "far from equilibrium", one in which no configuration is
ever repeated exactly, but which following perturbation can settle temporarily
into any of a very large number of possible steady states, in each of which it
can then adjust to small changes in one or a few variables without being trans-
formed, such changes and adjustments being in practice continuous and endem-
ic (Laszlo 1986: 154). It is this adjustment capacity that allows government to
intervene, to make relatively small changes in the patterns of a particular arena,
so as to manage it; by (i) formalising the arena - turning what is an area of "natu-
ral" conflict of interests into a more self-conscious "bargaining" forum, or a dis-
course-less relationship into an intercommunicating one; (ii) canalizing it - im-
posing rules of some kind, or changing current ones, so that the conflict contin-
ues but is not the same process as before (in currently fashionable sporting
metaphor, "moving the goal posts"); or (iii) merely biasing or manipulating it -
leaving all the variables as they are, but altering a few values so as to put a
particular "spin" on the process, or so as to "doctor" the outcomes. Of course,
government action can also - either by accident (overenthusiastic use of these
techniques) or on purpose - destabilise an arena, destroying the balance of forces
entirely.
Social conflict situations are dynamic, in constant flux, and from one point of
view government interventions are merely another source of change and occa-
sional perturbation. From another point of view, this particular actor (the gov-
ernment or state) is conventionally endowed by the prevailing belief-system
with special responsibilities, for at least maintaining the society’s integrity
against external threat or internal disruption, and with legitimacy for the pur-
suit of other electorally ratified goals.
"Government", of course, or "state", is not in practice a single actor, but a conge-
ries of actors, endowed with these special responsibilities (and accountabilities)
but not necessarily acting in concert - indeed, one not necessarily even aware
of what another is doing, and sometimes pursuing contradictory policies and
institutional self-interests. Contemporary political science sees each such actor
operating within a number of networks comprising other state actors and non-
state actors, the networks overlapping but each different because based on a
particular issue or policy field (Marin/ Mayntz 1991; Marsh/ Rhodes 1992).
It is this image of government which is behind the present paper, and Section
3 is devoted to this aspect of modern societies. But so as not to entangle the
main thread of the argument too much, the word "government" or "government
agency" will continue to be used without specifying which agency, and the
broader word "arena" will often be used rather than the more specifically ana-
lytic "policy or issue network".
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The most ubiquitous and almost traditional arena of continuing social antago-
nism, where one collective actor aiming to maximise some value is invariably
opposed and held at bay by another aiming to maximise a different and contra-
dictory value, is probably the field of industrial relations, an expression of the
labour market. Government interventions of all intensities can be found there,
from formalising (e.g. arbitration machinery) to destabilising (e.g. making trade
unions illegal), through canalizing (e.g. regulating strike calls) and manipulating
(e.g. requiring the circulation of certain information to all employees). But any
market is by definition such an arena; a change in Bank Rate is a manipulation
of the financial markets, and a "social engineering" duty on some commodity,
for purposes other than raising revenue, is a biasing of the market in that com-
modity.
A democratic political system with opposing parties is another obvious arena,
especially at election times. Indeed, once the idea is suggested, an advanced
industrial society does seem to be populated by antagonistic pair-groups: not
only the "macro" combatants like capital and labour, the champions of ethnic
and linguistic divisions, and the major economic interest groups in each sector,
such as road and rail haulage, farmers and the food processors, landlords and
tenants, who are as it were antagonistic ex officio or by role; but also "micro"
groups of like-minded individuals, campaigning e.g. for peace or against smok-
ing, for noise abatement or against vivisection, who wish to educate public
opinion but benefit from having specific antagonists in view. Groups formed
principally for mutual aid and fellowship, among poliomyelitis sufferers, rape
victims, immigrants, are yet very ready to take up cudgels against what they
see as hostile forces; even groups who come together to foster particular enthu-
siasms - steam trains, bird watching, or late Beethoven string quartets - may
become militant in certain circumstances. A group taking up cudgels, or becom-
ing militant, implies moving from holding and expressing views to the media,
the government, or other third parties, towards "locking horns" more directly
with the opponent, delivering what economic, political or legal (sometimes
physical) "blows" it can muster to try and even up the score. An enormous
amount of energy in our societies is devoted to these attempts to make sure
that people acting against our interests (whoever "we" are) do not get away
with it - energy that can be tapped and harnessed for government’s purposes.
The technique of managing such antagonisms is evidently not at all new in
practice. Yet it has no name that I know of, an established term that encapsu-
lates the manipulation of balancing social tensions, the controlled shifting of
a social equilibrium, the fine tuning of an oscillation of near-equal forces. In
earlier work I have used the term "selective inhibition of opposed maximisers"
(Dunsire 1978, 1986); more recently, co-libration or collibration (Dunsire 1990,
1993). When weights placed in one pan of a letter balance begin to equal the
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weight of a letter in the other, the scales librate, oscillating gently around the
horizontal. For the present purpose, we need to extend "librating" beyond the
see-saw image, and make it include the tug-of-war imagery and any other
system of tensions in balance (e.g. the rigging of a ship’s mast, some magnetic
fields, etc.), embracing also the possibility of several different pulls in several
directions. Co-libration means taking part in the balancing process, as did the
traditional butcher’s thumb; introducing a bias or compensator into such a field
so that the equilibrium is not quite where it would otherwise have been. More
explicitly, in the social context: collibration is defined as an intervention by
government to use the social energy created by the tension between two or
more social groupings habitually locked in opposition to one another to achieve
a policy objective by altering the conditions of engagement without destroying
the tension - unless deliberately. "Altering the conditions of engagement" might
involve either privileging one of the social actors or handicapping another, but
not necessarily at each other’s expense; a governmental input could benefit one
actor without depriving another.
One point needs clarifying before we go on, which is the relationship between
what we are investigating and the range of "tools of government" or "policy
instruments" briefly mentioned at the beginning of this Section.
In short, they are on separate dimensions. Collibration, the managing of an
existing social tension, can take three forms, as already indicated above - chang-
ing its variables, changing its values, changing its relationships (see Figure 1).
Policy instruments or tools of government correspond to categories of govern-
ment resources (though many "private" bodies have them too - Daintith 1988:
33), and conventionally are four: giving information, making laws or regula-
tions, using wealth or money, employing the public sector in direct action. From
the present point of view, any instrument can be used in collibration; and al-
though a case might be made for linking certain tools with certain interventions
(e.g. canalizing primarily by regulation, biasing very often by money-moving),
there is no real pattern of this kind, and I shall pay no particular attention to
the "tools" dimension.
One other note may be permissible. I am very well aware that an approach
through system theory and cybernetics can greatly illumine the processes dis-
cussed here, and I have used that approach in the earlier writing mentioned.
It is not developed in the present paper because it was not necessary.
Section 2 of the paper explores some "traditional" arenas of social conflict for
illustrations of the collibration technique in operation, namely industrial rela-
tions, industrial democracy, the markets, and the democratic political process.
In the third Section, the application of the idea to policy networks and peak
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associations is discussed. Then Section 4 will present a tentative analysis and
appraisal.
Figure 1: Government Collibrations in Social Processes
Canalizing Alteration of the "rules" of the social process
(e.g. government imposes minimum standards, or criminalises
certain behaviour)
Biasing Manipulation of the existing dynamics of the social process
(e.g. government provides information to one of the actors)
Formalizing Creating discourse in a discourseless social process
(e.g. government brings together packaging manufacturers,
refuse processors, and environmentalists to discuss common
problems)
2. Collibration in Traditional Arenas
The paradigm manipulative collibration is portrayed in the image of the child
at the fulcrum of the see-saw, shifting her small weight so as to lower and raise
an adult at each end. The impartiality of the court of law is symbolized by the
blind goddess with her scales, weighing evidence adversarially presented before
her and coming down on one side, but having no policy programme of her own.
The judicial process is not regarded here as an arm of "government". Yet there
is no doubt that the outcomes of the application of a particular statute or princi-
ple can sometimes be swung around by a shift in a procedural rule - e.g. where
the burden of proof is placed, or who has legal standing to bring an action -
which has the form of a collibration.
An interesting parallel in purely recreational affairs is the use by "governing
bodies" of the fertile notion of the handicap - in horse racing, in golf and other
sports, and even in the village fete tug-of-war. The handicap is a sometimes
extremely elaborate mechanism for establishing (within the rules of the game)
what in a different sporting metaphor is often called a "level playing field", in
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order to achieve a fairer race or game in the face of widely-differing capacities
in the players.
We shall look for illustrations of governmental interventions in the attempt to
alter the conditions of engagement in a situation; first in the labour market,
then in other markets, and in the politics of elections.
2.1 Industrial relations
In the field of industrial relations any intervention by government might be said
to be an attempt to change the balance of power between the forces of capital
and labour in the labour market. In a comparative study sponsored by the
Commission of the European Communities (Baglioni/ Crouch 1990), the Swed-
ish contributors give a long list of laws passed by the Social Democratic govern-
ment in the early 1970s "aimed at improving the situation of workers and limit-
ing the prerogatives of employers" (covering co-determination, employment
security, rights of workers to use paid time for trade union work, seats for trade
union representatives on company boards, safety and health activities in the
enterprise, job security and employment promotion, educational leave, holiday
entitlements, and retirement rules); and then under the heading "Tug-of-war
over employers’ prerogatives", they say:
Recent employer strategies, such as individual profit-sharing, the decentralization
of wage-bargaining, quality circles and the like, must therefore be seen as an
employer defence policy - even if the ingredients of the policy are the same as
can be found in countries like the USA where they represent more an offensive
against unions (Rehn/ Viklund 1990: 309).
The flaw in the image, of course, is that the employer strategies did not involve
government intervention by a string of legislative acts. But it is not impossible
to conceive of such, and indeed, in Britain not long afterwards the Conservative
government was embarking upon just such a series of legislative changes with
aims like those of the Swedish Social Democratic government but in favour of
the other side. Crouch lists them under four headings:
1 Actions designed simply to weaken the power of the unions and/or of work-
ers in relations with employers, including ... severely restricting by law the
right of workers to picket plants and take ’secondary’ action in support of
other strikers.
2 Actions to reduce the institutional regulation of conflict in order to expose
industrial relations more directly to market forces, including abolishing ...
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Pay Research Units ... and Wages Councils ... for poorly-paid workers [and
the mechanisms for negotiation of school teachers’ salaries];
3 Actions designed to reduce the legitimacy of trade unions as participants in
national life ... the government itself refused to permit union membership
among its employees at Government Communications Headquarters.
4 Legal measures to increase the power of union members and/or workers in
general against union organizations, including the right not to join a union
in face of a ’closed shop’ agreement; encouraging by offering subsidies secret
postal ballots in elections for union officials and votes on strike calls; enabling
employers to take legal action against the funds of unions calling a strike
without a prior ballot; and requiring unions wishing to maintain a political
fund to resubmit the decision to do so to a secret ballot of the members every
ten years (Crouch 1990: 330-332).
These litanies of legislative action show what a government bent on privileging
one side in the "tug-of-war" between employers and workers can do (though
they are not, of course, exhaustive lists). Yet in each of these two countries there
remains a prevalent norm that wage bargaining and negotiations over condi-
tions of work are matters for "the two sides of industry" to thrash out between
them, free from state interference. In Sweden, respecting the rule of non-inter-
vention in substantive negotiation over wages, the authors say, the Swedish
government has always tried more indirect ways of influencing overall wage
developments, such as ministerial speeches, or even offering tax concessions
and price subsidies to gain acceptance of wage restraint to keep down inflation
(Rehn/ Viklund 1990: 314). Crouch for his part says that it is still the British
government’s policy that "employers - and not governments or trade unions -
should have power in industrial relations" (Crouch 1990: 339).
Given these intentions, both in Sweden and in the United Kingdom, it is possi-
ble to see even these lengthy series of full-scale statutory changes in labour law
as, indeed, a deliberate distortion of the arena, altering the slope of the playing
field, siding massively with one of the teams against the other, and similar
metaphors for introducing bias into the bargaining process - but without wish-
ing to do away with bargaining, to substitute government decisions, or even
to impose draconian limitations on outcomes.
A contrast with both the Swedish and the British examples can be seen in vari-
ous other countries of Europe at the same time: in Belgium, the government,
"convinced that independent collective bargaining was no longer compatible
with the economic and financial constraints imposed by the state of the econo-
my, did not hesitate to limit or do away with that independent sphere" (Spineux
1990: 49). There, as well as in an earlier decade in Britain, and in Denmark,
Italy, the Netherlands and elsewhere, governments imposed a wage freeze,
imposed limits on increases or laid down fixed amounts, and so on, in various
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versions of "incomes policy": not so much regulating collective bargaining as
superseding it. Such interventions would have to be called "destabilising", from
the present point of view.
From that point of view, the question is only whether the British/Swedish
interventions are "manipulations" or rather something stronger - "canalizings"
of the process. The Swedish safety and health legislation giving elected safety
delegates powers to stop temporarily machines they considered dangerous,
pending confirmation by official inspectors, may be seen as "privileging whistle-
blowers", and to that extent "changing the balance of power" in the plant with-
out altering its sources. The British government’s offer of a subsidy to encour-
age unions to use postal ballots in elections of oficers as an attempt to weaken
the influence of activists at open meetings was a form of handicapping. But
the various abolitions of wage negotiating machinery, the outlawing of "second-
ary picketing" (which includes picketing company headquarters, or any other
plant of the same company or organized by the same union), and the prohibi-
tion on union membership at GCHQ, for example, were attacks on the process
itself, changing the "goalposts" and the whole nature of the game.
2.2 Industrial democracy
A similar analysis may be made of moves in the 1970s and 1980s on another
front of the war between capital and labour, towards "industrial democracy",
or "co-determination". These made little headway in Britain and most countries
of Europe (Schuller 1985; Baglioni 1990: 24), the exception being West Germany.
The statutory institutions of Mitbestimmung established in Germany just after
the 1939-45 war - providing for equal representation of capital and labour on
the supervisory boards of coal and steel companies in 1951, and for elected
works councils at workplace level in practically all establishments in 1952, along
with one-third representation for the workforce on the supervisory boards of
many of the large companies - have survived recurring periods of distrust on
the part of both trade unions and employers’ organizations. Whether it was
their previous "collective historical experience" of a long and strong tradition
of "peak associations" (Lehmbruch 1991: 148) that enabled the institutions of
compulsory Mitbestimmung to work in the first place, or whether it was the
experience of obligatory co-determination that has conditioned the approach
of both workers and employers in West Germany to the vicissitudes of the past
two decades, industrial relations there have shown much greater stability and
equanimity than in most other countries of Europe, even those with an equally
strong tradition of concertation (Scharpf 1987, 1991b).
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In reviewing four decades of co-determination, Wolfgang Streeck noted that,
on the one hand, trade union representatives who filled most of the worker
seats on works councils and supervisory boards were able to delay redundan-
cies and labour shedding, pressing instead for "internal mobility" - retraining
workers for other jobs within the company. On the other hand, it was just such
union support for flexibility, coupled with imaginative anticipatory manpower
planning, that made German companies highly adaptable to technological
change (Streeck 1984: 399). The essence of co-determination, Streeck says, is
a mutual incorporation of capital and labour by which labour internalizes the inter-
ests of capital just as capital internalizes those of labour (Streeck 1984: 416).
Such a characterizing makes it evident that co-determination goes much farther
than biasing, or even canalizing and formalizing: it replaces the system. The
original Mitbestimmung legislation, though undeniably an intervention of palpa-
bly Olympian dimensions by the allied occupation régime in German social
processes ("a major element in the design of a democratic political order in
Germany" - Streeck 1984: 394), was no "manipulation" of these processes, but
a creative destabilisation; structural in Offe’s terms, destroying existing processes,
substituting them by new ones, so that problems will become manageable:
The variable to be manipulated and balanced, in this case, is not policy outputs,
but the system of interest representation and the modes of resolution of conflict. It is
this standard of political rationality that inspires ’the search for the stable ordered
society, for a system where competition, class conflict, and political disunity [are]
structurally rendered impossible’ (Harris 1972: 66; see also Offe 1986: 126).
However, some of the later changes in the legislation could be seen as manipu-
lative, the government of the day "tweaking" the system in the interest of one
of the sides. In the Co-Determination Act of 1976, for example, the inclusion,
in reserving some of the workers’ seats on supervisory boards for representa-
tives of trade unions, of the possibility that some of those reserved seats could
be filled by persons not employed by the firms, enabled unions to place head-
quarters officials on the supervisory boards of larger companies, with full rights
to information (Streeck 1984: 408). This provision depended for its efficacy on
the customary working of the existing rules of the social process; and so falls
within our definition of collibratory manipulation.
2.3 The Markets
For all the latter-day rant about the incompatibility of "market methods" and
"government interference", it has been well-accepted since Adam Smith’s time
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that any real market is embedded in law and politics one way or another. Krüs-
selberg notes, though producing no evidence:
It is a striking though rarely reflected trait of Western industrial societies that
the degree of regulation and institutionalization increases massively along the
way, starting from commodity markets through financial markets to labor mar-
kets ... which reveal[s] the extent to which societies react to what they consider
legitimate grievance regarding the markets’ performance and, thus, reveal[s] the
political content of the economic ’constitution’ of a society (Krüsselberg 1986:
379).
Perhaps this is just a way of saying that markets "fail" more frequently the
farther along that way, or perhaps the "factor" markets are easier for govern-
ments to regulate, requiring much less disparate knowledge and experience
than the more numerous and various commodity or goods and services mar-
kets.
There is a well-appreciated conventional distinction between regulating the
markets and intervening in the markets. The former involves e.g. providing a
framework of law to ensure keeping of contracts, provide good coinage, and
recognise collective bargaining; or taking government action to avert or remedy
"market failure" by e.g. antitrust legislation. "Intervening" in the markets in this
sense involves the government going in as a participant, by e.g. using the gov-
ernment’s large purchasing power to force down a price, selling foreign curren-
cy to prop up its own, or wielding labour market leverage as a large employer.
The kind of government intervention we are looking at here, however, being
neither of those, does not seem to have been noted before as a separate catego-
ry: leaving the powerful market mechanisms as they are, but furthering uncon-
nected government policy aims by manipulating these mechanisms. There are
three main categories: using the taxing power as a programme tool; loan guar-
antees; and what we may call "remedial information".
Taxation of commodities raises necessary revenue but it also clearly alters costs
differentially, and quite sensitively: the different levels of duty on (for example)
spirits, beer and wine are a matter of trade war politics for some countries. But
if the government does use selective imposition of duties in this way, not mere-
ly to collect revenue but to affect consumption patterns, to encourage or dis-
courage spending on particular goods, it is collibrating - relying on the normal
"reconciliation" of opposed but complementary interests to distribute values,
but introducing a loading into the pricing mechanism, calculated to alter the
outcomes in a specific way. High taxes on tobacco and alcohol for health pro-
motion objectives, low or zero VAT on books and newspapers for "democratic"
reasons, lower duty on unleaded and diesel fuels or a more general "carbon
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tax" for environmental protection purposes, and all such selective taxes on
consumption goods, are "social engineering" via the market-place.
A thoroughgoing illustration of a deliberate rigging of the market in the inter-
ests of society was the "social tax" proposed by the UK Pearce Report on Sus-
tainable Development in 1989, which would extend the idea of the carbon tax
to pesticides, CFCs and other kinds of threat to the environment, calculating
it by first giving a cash value to unspoilt environmental assets from rivers and
soil to butterfly species, so that damage could be assessed in equally hard
terms. The author, an economist, was reported as saying that he did not believe
in free markets, but in market manipulation to achieve environmental goals -
a clear collibrationist credo.
Tax reliefs, subsidies, grants and loans can also have non-monetary purposes:
abolishing company-car tax allowances might reduce national car-mileage fig-
ures noticeably, as indeed might heavy investment in improving public trans-
port, with environmental outcomes. But not all tax expenditures and other
forms of government money-moving are collibratory in effect. Though they may
be claimed as "distortions" of the market, they do not actually use market mech-
anisms to achieve their purpose. A loan guarantee, however, does.
Government loan guarantees have been prominent in federal housing programs
in the United States, and received much attention after the collapse of so many
Savings and Loans societies. But they are widely used in other spheres, in
construction, in space technology, in fiscal relief to bankrupt city governments,
in foreign aid and many other fields. A much shorter list could be provided
for the United Kingdom, including aspects of student loans, export credits, and
higher education funding, where the government in 1992 ended the prohibition
on borrowing by universities and colleges against government assets, enabling
them to obtain loans from the banks with full government guarantee. The loan
guarantee is the government putting its thumb on the scales of a private trans-
action in the money market between one private actor and another, to make
balance what otherwise probably would not - the bankers’ criteria of loanwor-
thiness and the financial characteristics of the applicant: an illustration of an
overt collibratory biasing.
The remaining major intervention of this type by government in the markets
is "remedial information". It is a widespread criticism of the economic theory
of the pure market that its assumptions of symmetry of information are unreal-
istic, and that the weaker and more vulnerable the consumer, the greater the
asymmetry. As Bardach expresses it, "Liberal ideology has posited an ’imbal-
ance of power’, originating in unjustly operating markets ... which government
should redress" (Bardach 1989: 210):
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How many of us, after all, can understand the technical characteristics of house-
hold products that increase the risks of accidents or decrease product reliability
or quality? Surrounded by strange chemicals and complex machinery, how many
workers can understand the true hazards to which they are vulnerable or know
how to protect themselves from those hazards? Who can determine, standing
in the reception room of a nursing home, whether the staff will treat his or her
disabled parent humanely? (Bardach/ Kagan 1982: 241).
Remedial information may be prepared and published directly by government,
as with lists of permitted additives in food, or of drugs withdrawn from general
sale, and fuel economy performance data for different cars against standard
government tests; or government may encourage (perhaps by subsidy) a volun-
tary or private institution (such as citizens’ advice bureaux) to collect and pub-
lish comparative information of the same sort. But there is also a market in
consumer information: there are commercial companies with their own testing
laboratories, maintaining close links with their opposite numbers in other coun-
tries, who sell "Best Buy" magazines (though they perhaps seldom reach the
most vulnerable consumers).
Sometimes, government can without regulation or other legal sanction persuade
producers to label a product in a prescribed way or to publish certain data
which will enable consumers to make comparisons for themselves. The classic
case is the "informal agreement" with tobacco manufacturers in USA and UK
that they print a "Government Health Warning" on every pack of cigarettes,
and publish the tar and nicotine content of each brand. Industry self-regulation
of "advertising standards" is a similar example, although in extreme cases there
is usually the possibility of a fraud prosecution.
The most frequent device, however, is the formal requirement for "mandatory
disclosure", by which a producer of goods or services is by regulation (or condi-
tion attached to grant, contract, licence etc.) required to furnish specified infor-
mation, to customers, workforce, or the general public. This method is used
extensively in the food retail market and in financial services, requiring (as
already noted) contents labelling and shelf-life indication on many kinds of
edibles; requiring bank or credit card advertisements for loans to publish inter-
est charges in a standard form, and requiring company reports to shareholders
and investors to contain certain standard information. Some countries require
hotels and restaurants to post their meal charges prominently outside the pre-
mises, both to warn potential customers of the class of provision and to prevent
arbitrary pricing inside; bar prices must often be posted up in the bar. The
ubiquitous taxi meter represents mandatory disclosure of remedial information.
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Not all compulsory labelling is specifically remedial. The requirement for the
prominent labelling of hazardous chemicals, for example, or of poisons used
in the home and in industrial solvents, are perhaps more in the interests of
simple safety than of redressing a balance. The presence of such signs can,
however, be "consciousness raising" (Bardach/ Kagan 1982: 245), and lead not
only to greater care but to pressures for safer alternatives.
Not all "remedial information" is market-oriented, either. "Mandatory disclo-
sure" applies to government itself where there are Freedom of Information Acts,
and voluntary bodies such as Citizens’ Advice Bureaux do a lot of their "trade"
in redressing the asymmetry of information between citizens and government.
British Prime Minister John Major’s 1991 initiative on "The Citizen’s Charter"
is an odd example of a government itself intervening between the citizen and
public agencies, to ensure the publication of performance standards, the infor-
mation to enable evaluation, and in some cases, cash compensation for short-
falls; "changing the relationship between the citizen and the state", as he called
it, in such matters as hospital waiting-lists, late-running trains, mail delivery
times, examination pass rates in schools, and so on. The initiative stops well
short of creating justiciable rights, but by May 1993 compensation amounting
to £2 million had been paid out, half of it by British Rail.
There is only a thin line between the instrument of mandatory disclosure and
ordinary imposition of standards (e.g. of weights and measures, or of product
safety). One way of expressing the difference is that an enforced regulation of
the latter kind simply removes "risky" goods or services from the market, while
mandatory disclosure allows the market to price the risks. Then a worker can
choose to take a job in what he or she knows is a dangerous environment in
return for higher wages, while the employer can choose a trade-off between
cost of risk reduction and price advantage, knowing that labour will be avail-
able. People who know that the particular sweeteners they like have known
risks in certain circumstances can decide whether to continue to use them.
An information tool thus makes more use of the pressures and disciplines
already implicit in the market or other social conflict process. It can also be a
good "second best" strategy to counter what Bardach and Kagan call the "dirty
secrets" and "cloud of confusion" problems, where imposition of rules is difficult
- where intelligence is hard to obtain, standards hazy, detection haphazard,
sanctions weak, monitoring skills scarce, and so on:
Under an information strategy, individuals are their own ubiquitous inspectors,
tailor their own standards to particular risks, and invoke their own sanctions
(such as denying patronage to a firm or demanding certain improvements in
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working conditions), and in some circumstances, these sanctions are powerful
indeed (Bardach/ Kagan 1982: 248).
To sum up: any provision of information that has "remedial" effects - that is,
supplies information to one side in a potential bargain that the other side al-
ready has, thus redressing a balance of bargaining power, or permitting a more
"rational" choice - can be said to be collibratory. Such information may be sup-
plied directly by government, or by a private actor altruistically or commercial-
ly, or by private actors required by law to do so. The only question is whether
the last - mandatory disclosure - is a manipulation or, like the imposition of
standards, more of a canalization by our definition. I would be persuaded by
the Bardach and Kagan argument that while standard-imposition has as its aim
the removal of risk, mandatory disclosure allows the individual to price the
risk, and call mandatory disclosure also a manipulation, a mere shifting of
weight at the fulcrum: but it does not much matter - it is certainly a collibration.
2.4 The democratic political process
By the "political process" here I mean, in particular, the electoral process. The
formal electoral process is heavily regulated in most modern states simply
because it is an adversarial process where small manipulations can produce
large results. The number of members to be elected, the size and shape of elec-
toral districts, the amounts that may be spent on a candidature and the ways
that funds may be raised, the conditions of ballotting, the prevention of imper-
sonation, the counting of votes, and much else, are all regulated as carefully
as may be because it is recognised that the result (whatever the electoral sys-
tem) may turn on a few votes, and that a relatively small irregularity at any
of a score of points during the process may produce these few votes. The temp-
tation to manipulate in a particular interest is high because the possibilities are
high. Every means of regulating the electoral process is a means of managing
the electoral process.
Not every intervention in the drawing of electoral district boundaries was as
blatant as that of Governor Eldridge Gerry of Massachusetts in 1812, who con-
trived a Congressional district that would link a heavy majority for his party
in one town with eleven other towns in which it was outvoted slightly - the
shape of the district being then so grotesque as to give the game away. A news-
paper gave it a head, fins, and claws like a "salamander", from which the prac-
tice known as the "gerrymander" is derived. It was well known elsewhere long
before it got its name, and similar practices were prevalent in Northern Ireland
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between the two world wars (Lyons 1971: 745; Darby 1976: 50-53; Galliher/
DeGregory 1985: 24, 28-29).
Such interventions in the conduct of "free and fair elections" are often collective-
ly known as "dirty tricks". There are early senses of the word itself which link
"politick" to "scheming, crafty, cunning" (Oxford English Dictionary 1971: 2228);
and one line of the British national anthem is "Confound their politicks, frus-
trate their knavish tricks". To some extent, the situation is self-righting precisely
through its adversarial nature: one party will not be slow in revealing any
alleged malpractice by one of its opponents, perhaps "stretching the truth"
themselves. As Goodin remarks: "As soon as voters discover the trick it ceases
to work. J.K. Galbraith asserts that, more generally, ’People need to believe that
they are unmanaged if they are to be managed effectively’." (Galbraith 1967:
218; Goodin 1980: 12) But if the trick is on the scale of the "political business
cycle" (Nordhaus 1975), by which governments try to engineer an economic
boom in an election year, it may be difficult to spot what is deception and what
is good luck. Perhaps only the cognoscenti know, too, what is going on when
a government holds back "bad news" statistics until a crucial by-election is over,
or publishes controversial information late on a Friday after members of parlia-
ment have gone home; in such "dirty tricks", several tensions interact - govern-
ment and opposition, government and back-benchers, government and press -
and the "self-righting" (the checking of government) is longer term.
A more localised manipulation of the electoral process goes under the name
of the "pork barrel" in the United States, though the phenomenon is not un-
known in Britain and elsewhere: federal or central government spending on
facilities and installations, new hospitals or by-passes, or defence procurement
orders that will bring employment and trade to a locality and help to get the
incumbent representative re-elected. In his book Manipulatory Politics (1980)
Goodin defines "manipulation" much as we do here: "It is a general feature of
manipulation that, being an act of power, it alters the ordinary course of events.
... When we manipulate a committee agenda, we alter what would otherwise
have been the order of business" (13). But for Goodin manipulation always has
a negative connotation, a denial of self-determination, which is not necessarily
or always present in collibratory acts. For a government to make financial pro-
vision for the parliamentary or other expenditures of political parties out of
taxation revenues might be thought collibratory if its purpose were to create
"a more level playing-field" (or a fairer race), and although it might well alter
the relationship between the various parties that might otherwise obtain (by
a form of handicapping), it need not be deceptive or "manipulative" in Goodin’s
sense if done according to a formula and openly. But the distinction is often
impossible to maintain in practice. Any move a government may make in eco-
nomic management or domestic policy generally will have electoral calculations
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in its formulation; and every government utterance may be seen as an attempt
at persuasion through its choice of words and arguments (Goodin 1980; Hood/
Jackson 1991).
Major changes in the electoral rules, on the other hand, such as the substitution
of some form of proportional representation for a simple plurality system,
which will be advocated by parties who think they might benefit and resisted
by those who fear they might not, would probably be destabilising, whatever
the motives.
At a rather higher level of subtlety, the "pomp and circumstance" of sovereign-
ty, the pageantry of military displays, and the silent but massive witness of
government architecture (Edelman 1967, 1971; Lasswell/ Fox 1979) put their
own weight in the political scales. The political process by which members of
a government "come to power" offers many opportunities for the use of that
power to influence the process - with those who try to resist that vicious circle
having to fight very hard.
3. Collibration in Policy Networks
From a modern government’s operational point of view, the world is not now
one populated internally by its own citizens and externally by other govern-
ments (nations, states); nor even, for many purposes, by organizations (firms,
unions, churches, universities, etc.) internally and alliances or blocs externally.
Rather does a government deal internally with associations of organizations,
aggregating their common interests, or even "peak associations" grouping a
number of such associations; and the difference between "internal" and "exter-
nal" is disappearing - has all but disappeared within Europe (Dang-Nguyen
et al. 1993), and with the growth of multinationals, to a lesser extent in other
regions.
From one perspective, the size of the "corporate actor" (Coleman 1974, 1990)
has increased, while the appreciated size of the government actor has decreased
- no longer the Leviathan, but a hard-pressed ministry, or even a section of a
ministry, with limited comprehension and limited effective power in this highly
technical age, unless with the cooperation of the corporate actors targeted
(Mayntz 1983a).
The increase in size or coverage of the corporate actor is a gain, in control
terms, for by reducing the number of actors in the government’s purview in
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any policy arena, and aggregating the interests to be accommodated, it reduces
the variety of the system to be controlled - which, by Ashby’s "first law of
cybernetics", renders control more feasible (Ashby 1956). Social interaction
among larger organizations, each to some degree more transparent, is more
predictable than the cumulated effects of smaller organizations’ choices, and
more amenable to legal regulation (Kaufmann 1986; quoted in Mayntz 1993:
18). Government therefore has an interest in encouraging the emergence of
"peak associations", especially perhaps in arenas poorly furnished with them,
as in family and community affairs (Mayntz 1993: 19).
The decrease in effective power of the government actor, on the other hand,
means that the classic modes of intervention, by legislation and policing of
imposed standards, do not work where the government lacks the expertise and
the information to know what to prescribe, the means to detect when things
are going wrong, or the "clout" to change things when they do. Other less
obtrusive, less abrasive, less knowledge-hungry interventions will do better.
The classic solution was to get the corporate actors to agree their own standards
and regulate themselves. Most of the regulation that takes place in the United
States, say Bardach and Kagan (1982: 217), is in the hands not of government
officials but of auditors and inspectors within private organizations; indeed,
it is important to recognise that the total amount of governance in an advanced
industrial society, if one includes the internal control maintained by such orga-
nizations, is many times as great as that overtly deployed by formal or informal
government action. Within this sphere, a great many of the standards being
policed are those formulated by associations of manufacturers, conventions of
technical experts, and other "private" bodies. It is not otherwise in Europe,
where this is the province of "procedural regulation" and reflexive law (Mayntz
1983a; Teubner/ Willke 1984).
But the achievement of common industrial standards, or other such agreements,
involves a shift in the relations between corporate actors, from market competi-
tion, which can be "discourseless" (Gretschmann 1986: 389), towards a degree
of cooperation, which requires communication, across a "network". The "hidden
hand", say Bardach and Kagan (1982: 220), is not skilled at building a consensus
among competitors: it may need a kick-start. In public policy making govern-
ment agencies recognise themselves as part of such a network (cf. the zonal
representation of the UK tobacco network in Read 1992: 129), and make use
of it. So there are two aspects of interest here: clarifying the network, possibly
formalizing it; and operating in and through it, possibly by canalizing or biasing
it.
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3.1 Formalizing an arena
At the micro-level, government is trying to clarify an arena when it rules that
any building or development plans submitted for approval must be published
and objections heard. This as it were elicits what opposition there may be, and
allows it to articulate and mobilise, at a "safe" stage - before the approval pro-
cess is completed rather than after. The publication of any major government
plan, "Green Paper" or budget document performs a similar function at macro-
level, evoking latent conflicts and the relative positions and strengths of the
interests potentially involved.
Formalization of such a clarified arena consists of any action by government to
register these interests and any attempt to encourage the shift to communication
for a specific purpose (such as arriving at an industry standard). Market forces
can arrive at "consensus" of a kind, if one corporate actor is so dominant that
its standards drive out all others; or a traditional standard may be so widely
used, even if by no means the best or most effective, that no entrepreneur gets
far with a new one (cf. the "QWERTY" keyboard). But the normal way to en-
courage cooperative processes like standardization is the committee method
(Schmidt/ Werle 1992: 306), the bringing of interests around a table.
For government to do this is a collibratory intervention, albeit in its weakest
form, because by and large it circumscribes the freedom of action of the stron-
ger actors by obliging them to use rational argument rather than market clout,
and gives "voice" to less substantial actors out of proportion to their market
share. It imports the political decision method of majority rule, enhancing the
importance of numbers and devaluing size. The "industry giants" may still get
their way, of course. It also gives government a "voice", and government may
have a big stick of its own at its back: usually the threat of an imposed regula-
tion if the corporate actors cannot agree to fix their own standards.
Historically, however, the critical mass (Hohn/ Schneider 1991) for the opening
of discourse among corporate actors in many policy fields was generated in
a previous era, the motivating urge being self-defence against unilateral govern-
ment regulation. Thus the national associations of local authorities in Britain
were a response to creeping central government control (Rhodes 1981, 1986),
and at least part of the reason for the emergence in the 1950s and 1960s of
associations of manufacturers in almost any product field imaginable was the
need to negotiate collectively with government on import quotas, duties, prices,
safety regulations, and the like. A concomitant development was the setting
up of official bodies (later called "quangos"), such as the National Maritime
Council, on which the sponsoring officials and brief-holders from other depart-
ments would sit with representatives of all the interests involved, plus a "neu-
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tral" professor or two, so that government could accept the "advice" of a collec-
tive body, rather than be seen to bargain directly with the several trade interests
on a matter like "standards of crew accommodation on merchant ships" (Rhodes
1965), especially since there were international angles and the "national interest"
was involved.
Although perhaps not to the same extent in all countries (Lehmbruch 1991: 123),
the necessity, the scope, the sanctions and the precise terms of any proposed
change in the law affecting such interests could then be discussed with such
associations or in such forums. If the government were first to bargain such
a decision with an association’s leaders, and obtain their commitment to sup-
port and even recommend it to their members, the government could effectively
harvest the organizational delivery system of the association. When the bargain-
ing body is a neo-corporatist tripartite one, Mayntz says, its essence is the "re-
ciprocal enjoyment by the peak organizations of capital, labour and government
of each other’s internal control capacity" (1983a: 140).
Although peak associations are found in all modern industrialised countries
(and not only in the economic field: there are aggregate bodies in the religious
field, among charities, in environmental and heritage protection, in child and
animal care, in arts, entertainment and sport, and so on), they have a special
tradition in Germany. Formalized by procedural regulation and legally rec-
ognised earlier than in other European countries, the Spitzenverbände have been
"repeatedly of crucial importance in the settlement of protracted social conflicts"
(Lehmbruch 1992: 12), leading to "social peace treaties" like the celebrated Stin-
nes-Legien agreement in 1919 between capital and labour, or the less well-
known "Berlin Agreement" of 1913 between the medical associations and the
public health insurance funds (to which we shall come back in a moment).
Czada tells the story of the founding of the "Forum for Energies of the Future"
(Forum für Zukunftsenergien) by the Federal Economics Ministry in 1989. The
original proposal came from a section of the Ministry concerned with renewable
energy sources, with the idea of bringing together the rather weak and scattered
interests of manufacturers and others in the "alternative energy" fields (mainly
solar energy and windpower), both to create an industrial partner for them-
selves, and to provide a public counterweight to the existing "Atomic Forum".
With this in mind they even thought of calling it the "Solar Forum". But this
departmental-politics ploy was blocked by the nuclear spokesmen in the Minis-
try, who could not see why nuclear energy was not to be considered a future-
oriented and clean energy source. The electricity suppliers, without whose
cooperation a "Solar Forum" would have been ineffective, made their participa-
tion depend upon the representation of all the customary energy interests. So
the sphere of the proposed body was necessarily widened. The rather monopo-
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listic nuclear energy industry found itself having to support a body they
thought superfluous, and although rather pushed into it, felt obliged not so
much by the law as by the force of long tradition, the accepted legitimacy of
such bodies, to take part even though it meant that they would expose them-
selves to the critiques of the relative "small fry" of the energy world. The gov-
ernment, meanwhile, had assisted a congeries of weak, emergent interests to
organize in the face of a single, strong established interest - which could there-
fore no longer have everything its own way (Czada 1991: 159-160).
Some of the important Spitzenverbände have public law status (Offe 1986). This
not only gives their rulings legitimacy in the eyes of the general public and
legal force in respect of their own member organizations or associations (and
membership of a public law Spitzenverband is compulsory for organizations
within its sphere); it also allows the government to feel entitled to expect that
the sector will regulate its own affairs without additional governmental legal
sanctions. There are parallels in some non-public law countries. In Britain, the
General Medical Council, the Council of the Bar and the Law Society, the Secu-
rities and Investments Board (SIB, supervising the financial markets in the "City
of London"), and some other such bodies, have a statutory basis which gives
their rulings legal force in much the same way as would public law status, with
the same formal expectation that the internal problems of the professions can
be settled internally. British governments, on the other hand, would not have
the same expectations of, say, the Confederation of British Industry (linking
employers) or the Trades Union Congress, which have no statutory backing
but apart from that, are for other reasons simply not strong enough vis-à-vis
their members.
The question arises of what government may do if, an arena having been for-
malized and common standards arrived at, members simply ignore them. The
head of one of the UK’s largest investors, the Prudential Corporation, refusing
to join the latest of the SIB’s self-policing associations, alleged in the wake of
a series of financial scandals that the "City" was simply incapable of stamping
out fraud by itself. Another case in point is that of company directors’ emolu-
ments. Concern about the inability of shareholders to hold their nominal ser-
vants in the boardroom to account has a long history (Stone 1975; Nader 1976;
Houston 1992). In the United Kingdom a committee sponsored with govern-
ment participation by the Stock Exchange, under the chairmanship of Sir Adrian
Cadbury, produced in May 1992 a "Code of Best Practice for Corporate Gover-
nance", relying heavily (as had earlier American remedies) on the appointment
to the board of a sufficient number of non-executive directors from outside the
company to offset the power of executive directors and managers, and "bring
an independent judgement to bear on issues of strategy, performance, resources,
and standards of conduct". The Code covered a number of such issues; one of
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them was the fixing of executive directors’ contracts of service, which should
be done by sub-committees of non-executive directors; another was the respon-
sibility of auditors in respect of fraudulent or questionable business practice.
The Code had no force of law, but the Committee suggested that companies
listed on the Stock Exchange should be obliged to say annually which areas
of the Code they had not complied with, and explain why not, on pain of hav-
ing their listing withdrawn. They considered that statutory measures imposing
minimum standards would lead to compliance with the letter rather than the
spirit of their requirements.
The year after the appearance of the Cadbury "Code" saw not a fall but a wide-
spread escalation in the size of directors’ remuneration packages in company
after company, often on the recommendation of these non-executive sub-commit-
tees, to the point of scandalizing not only the workforces and trade unions of
the companies, but also the shareholders’ meetings, the financial press, the
government, and even the Institute of Directors. The government was of course
pressed to "regulate", by for example putting a statutory ceiling on "perform-
ance bonuses"; but the basic anti-regulation culture of the Conservative Cabinet
prohibited any such move, and the difference between the authoritarian setting
and bureaucratic policing of statutory minimum standards, and the strengthen-
ing by legislation or other means of a peak association’s power over its mem-
bers, was not appreciated.
As it happened the Stock Exchange had just suffered a blow to its own authori-
ty through the collapse of its computer-based trading system, and its very raison
d’etre was in question. Its "public censure" of a firm for a recent breach of rules
was seen as weak, not bolstering the case for self-policing of the City. With the
SIB also somewhat discredited the peak association solution would probably
have required a reformalization of the institutional framework. The alternative
collibratory solution would be to beef up the shareholders’ powers of control,
by further mandatory disclosures, or blocking minority provisions or the like.
But sufficient shareholder power in most of the large corporations is already
there, unused, with the "fund managers", the insurance companies and other
very large investors who (certainly collectively) usually own a controlling inter-
est, but (in contrast to their US counterparts) are traditionally unwilling to
intervene in the internal affairs of a company if its market share and dividends
are satisfactory. Government attention focussed here, and on the significant
question of auditors’ responsibilities rather than merely on remuneration, might
help the arena to return to self-policing.
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3.2 Operating in a network
The unwillingness of governments to exercise what Daintith called "unilateral
regulation" (1988: 31), in the deregulatory style of the decade, coincides with
the switch in the perceived "weight" of the actors discussed above, and is proba-
bly salutary in a high-tech world. Several studies of the ways government
agencies operate in the "policy network" framework exist, both nationally and
in the European Community context (Marin/ Mayntz 1991; Marsh/ Rhodes
1992; Dierkes/ Hoffman 1992; Greenwood/ Grote/ Ronit 1992), and it is not
my purpose here to add to them or even to summarize them. From the present
point of view, any action by a government in influencing the outcome of the
working of this kind of bargaining arena can be considered a collibration, since
it is an intervention in a system of non-ephemeral balancing forces with at least
the intention of achieving a public policy objective. The aim must be the
Spinozan one, to so rig the circumstances that the target actors see it as in their
interest to go in the direction the government hopes they will; and either by
sheer persuasive force or by the use of another resource, to tip the balance of
arguments in the arena.
An illustration is provided by the search for cost containment in the public
health insurance sector in Germany. A system of self-administering public
health insurance funds had been set up by Bismarck in 1883:
With the general extension of this system, doctors’ fees increasingly became
dependent on the health insurance funds. This collective ’traumatic experience’
(Döhler) led the medical community to a strong preference for collective organi-
zational action over the freedom of contract. In 1913, after a series of doctors’
strikes, and after a mediating intervention of the government, the medical associ-
ations finally succeeded in breaking the power exerted by the health insurance
funds over individual doctors by the establishment of a collective bargaining
system. In this system, joint committees with equal representation of both sides
were made responsible for the licensing of doctors to practise in the public health
system (Kassenärzte) and for the conclusion of contracts. ... Its corporatist charac-
ter became still more pronounced since the establishment in 1932 of compulsory
associations (Kassenärztliche Vereinigungen) to represent the Kassenärzte. These
associations have developed into powerful actors. They not only effectively de-
fend the interests of the medical profession within the public health insurance
system but also enforce the rules established in these bargaining processes on
their - often very reluctant - clientele (Lehmbruch 1992: 13).
Health policy in Germany has continued to be dominated by this collective
bargaining system, of which the Bundesausschuß der Ärzte und Krankenkassen
is an expression, and which is incompatible with the "market methods" that
some tried to introduce into the health sector reform legislation of 1988 (Lehm-
bruch 1992: 13). Lehmbruch calls it "the result of an organizational equilibrium
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achieved in the triangular relationship of medical associations, health insurance
funds, and the sectoral bureaucracy" (ibid.).
But by the 1970s the relative power of the doctors and the funds had been
reversed (compared with 1913), and in the interests of checking the escalation
of health costs the government now tried to steer this equilibrium in the other
direction by strengthening the bargaining position of the health insurance
funds. These were very fragmented, organized regionally as well as by types
of clientele, and varied one from another considerably in their regulations (for
example, the premium payable by insured persons ranged from eight per cent
to fifteen per cent), and even in the fee schedules for much the same kind of
medical work. Their differing professional approaches frequently led not only
to disagreement among them, but even to competition between them at the
bargaining table with the more "solid" insurance doctors’ association - which
the latter were not slow to exploit.
So the bureaucrats began to insert clauses in health bills, to lessen the differenc-
es between the several health insurance funds (not without resistance from
some of the advantaged ones), to bring fee schedules into line, to recommend
guidelines on maximum increases for doctors, and most recently (1992, after
much controversy) to permit insured persons some choice between funds. By
such means differences between the funds were reduced and their solidarity
against the doctors increased.
Another strategy in the cost containment war was to try to bring the hospital
sector and the pharmaceutical industry closer to the formal self-regulating
framework of the health care system. Reference prices for medicines to be paid
for by the insurance funds were fixed by a peak association of the health insur-
ance funds after negotiation with the insurance doctors’ associations, and after
listening to (but not negotiating with) the associations of pharmaceutical manu-
facturers. Attempts in the mid-1980s to negotiate drug prices directly between
the insurance funds and the pharmaceutical industry failed, partly because of
claimed conflict with the anti-trust laws. A section in the Cost Containment
Act of 1988 provided that federal associations of the pharmaceutical industry
could make agreements with peak associations of the insurance funds under
the umbrella of the Bundesausschuß, but these were intended to cover such
matters as package format, collection of consumption statistics and the like, not
prices for medicines. By mid-1993 no such discussions had taken place. As an
actor in the health care network the pharmaceutical industry is the least inte-
grated into the formal self-regulatory framework. The 1988 Act similarly au-
thorised discussions between the hospital sector and the insurance funds, but
the private-law status of the hospitals and their regional associations kept them
outside the Bundesausschuß (Döhler/ Manow-Borgwardt 1992).
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Health costs refused to come down despite the government’s efforts to manipu-
late the bargaining arena, and despite threats that if the associations could not
get together to develop "guidelines" for themselves, the government would
resort to regulation. But one success was registered: the insurance doctors
agreed to the "capping" of the global sum for fees (Lehmbruch 1992: 14). By
this concession they protected the 1913 settlement in the health policy network
against the challenge of the health economists.
Such phenomena are not altogether absent in other countries. Manipulation
of the interest group structure can be detected in the nuclear energy politics
of the United States, and even in "AIDS-Politik" in Switzerland (Czada 1991:
154-160), while the gradual reformation of the law profession in England (gov-
erned by two bodies with possibly the nearest one gets under British law to
"public law" status) can be seen to be nudged by the Lord Chancellor’s Depart-
ment in quite similar ways, though with less success so far.
4. Analysis and Appraisal
We now review the empirical examples of collibratory activity described in
Sections 2 and 3 and consider first the apparent conditions and limits of colli-
bration, the circumstances under which it is likely to emerge, and the factors
which may make it more effective or appropriate than other forms of interven-
tion. Then there are some interesting questions thrown up by the American
literature on regulation which can be asked of any form of government inter-
vention: Is it a phenomenon of its age? Does it travel well? Is it subject to de-
cay? Finally, for any type of government activity the question of accountability
and the "audit trail" arises.
4.1 Conditions and limits of collibration
The first and most obvious requirement is a social "stand-off" involving "oppos-
ing maximisers" - not necessarily only two: several parties may be jointly hold-
ing each other at bay, as it were. A "stand-off" implies a social process with
a compensatory ’eigendynamic’, where a shift in one direction calls forth forces
tending in the opposite direction; not, that is, a reinforcing dynamic or vicious
circle. "Opposing" implies interaction, some degree of operational collision or
tension; and "maximisers" implies action, doing, performance, in relatively
single-minded pursuit of a goal; not, that is, a mere propensity to do so, an
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outlook or opinion, or even an interest. The process must be a relatively endur-
ing one, not ephemeral, or else government is unlikely to be sufficiently aware
of it. The matter must be of some social consequence, or else government is
unlikely to be involved; that indicates a clash not of personal values but of e.g.
occupational or corporate or ethnic interests - "the more objective and less
personal the hostility, the more intense, irreconcilable and stubborn the fight"
(Simmel 1955: 91). Finally, the forces in tension have to be relatively equal, if
binary, or so that their vectors sum to near-zero, if more than two; so that
although random changes in the situation or in the environment might give
now one and now another a small advantage, such movements of the point
of equilibrium would stay within a relatively small area. If otherwise, the situa-
tion would not be stable.
It is these conditions, we are assuming, that are already keeping each of these
social conflicts under control. Each arena is self-policing: it does not need out-
side intervention to keep it within limits. There are two reasons why the gov-
ernment might wish to intervene. First, if the relative balance between the
opposing interests is gradually eroding, because of internal or environmental
changes, and the government prefers that the system’s capacity for self-regula-
tion be maintained. In that case, it will collibrate to strengthen the weakening
element(s) or inhibit the one gaining ground. Second, although the situation
is stable, the area of equilibrium carved out by the limits of random oscillation
may not be quite in the place the government would like it to be. Again, the
government can "steer" this area by inhibiting one force or strengthening anoth-
er.
But the area of equilibrium cannot be shifted very far from its former average
position without the risk of destabilising the situation. Giving two or three
members of one side better boots in a tug-of-war might just give them a slight
advantage in certain weather conditions; giving them an extra man would
probably ruin the contest. Giving loan guarantees to applicants whose financial
characteristics fall too far below the thresholds that would get them a "commer-
cial" loan reduces eventual cash flow to the point where the system cannot
sustain itself.
Another obvious condition of successful collibration is that the intervener have
good information about the dynamics and current state of the conflict, and a
good theory about the likely effects of intervention. Deficient knowledge can
lead to simple reverses of the intended effect: requiring a secret ballot of trade
union members before a strike can be legally initiated backfired on the British
government by turning the ballotting into a mobilising campaign, because their
judgement of the relative militancy of members and leaders was invalid. More
disastrously, as with some minor ecological interventions (the introduction of
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rabbits and blackberries into Australia come to mind), and in international
affairs where the intervention is into the politics of another country (many
examples recently, in former Yugoslavia or in famine-ravaged countries like
Somalia), a well-meaning but insufficiently-informed canalization or manipula-
tion may indeed "tip the balance", but into instability, triggering off a reinforc-
ing process that may end in destruction. The rapid Bank Rate changes an-
nounced by the Bank of England on the morning of "Black Wednesday" (16
September 1992), despite or because of their unusually high steps, not only
failed entirely in their purpose to secure the exchange rate of the pound ster-
ling, because the underlying stability of the international money market had
already been destroyed by the currency speculators; but indeed, made things
worse, by confirming that the British authorities were "on the run", thus adding
a twist to the downward spiral from which the speculators intended to profit.
The need for sensitivity to nuance is even greater than for ordinary restrictive
regulation, precisely because collibration is designed to maintain the tension
of opposed forces, not merely to require and enforce compliance with the prop-
erly-authorised law. A particular sensitivity is required to the interconnected-
ness of social tensions, to "ripple and spread" (Bardach 1989: 202; Stewart 1988:
118).
4.2 Aetiology
There is no single answer to the question of cause that will embrace all the
traditional interventions like mandating time off for union work, remedial
information, and gerrymandering, as well as the newer manifestations. If gov-
ernment wants a particular result but cannot (or does not want to) develop,
lay down and then police a set of standards to achieve it, and if it sees that
there are factors or forces working in the direction of its preferred result, it may
take whatever opportunity offers to strengthen these forces, or weaken any
working in the opposite direction. But that is just to describe what we have
defined as collibration.
Some elements in that account may, however, be illuminating. "Cannot develop,
lay down, and police a set of standards" includes the situation Mayntz calls
"government failure", with four isolable causes: rather too briefly,
problems of implementation, when enforcement is impractical;
problems of motivation, when compliance is unwilling;
problems of knowledge, when cause/effect assumptions are invalid;
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problems of governability, when the social process involved is impervious to
intervention of the kind available (Mayntz 1993: 13).
Each of those kinds of cause brings forth a different set of remedies: "bottom-
up" strategies, incentives, computers, reflexive law, and so on. If the necessary
conditions are present, collibration seems at least a more universal and flexible
remedy than these "cause-specific" ones.
"Does not want to develop ... etc." is a different matter, and concerns the degree
of the government agency’s commitment to its preferred outcome, or at least
to a "unilateral regulation" path towards it. Obliging actors on pain of punish-
ment to do something may be ideologically repugnant in a certain field; or
politically imprudent, risking valuable support; or administratively vexatious,
likely to be more disruptive of current routines or to arouse more complaints
than it seems worth. More than that: if the government sets a technical (or legal,
or moral) standard, deviation from which will be met with sanctions, it needs
to specify as clearly as may be feasible what that standard is - which means
clarifying policy objectives, a prescription beloved of management consultants
and economic advisers but often a hostage to fortune for politicians and bureau-
crats. For collibration, where it can be used, substantive compulsory standards
do not need to be specified: either the standards concerned are in contention
between the conflicting forces, which gets the government off the hook, or else
controversial standards can by appropriate mandatory disclosure be converted
into prices in a market and the consumer left to choose.
Governments who have used collibratory methods as instanced in the paper
are quite unlikely to have selected them by other than "unreflected preference"
(Mayntz 1983a: 130). That is, they might have their reasons, but they were likely
to have been specific to the situation they faced, and to be justified by phrases
like "it was the obvious thing to do". But on the above analysis, collibratory
methods are likely to have emerged when one or other of the causes of "govern-
ment failure" was operating, or when there were grave political or administra-
tive objections to committing the government to the clarity and precision of
a substantive regulation, and the necessary conditions of a collibration were
present.
4.3 Effectiveness
The question whether collibratory action is more effective than another form
of intervention depends upon another variable in the particular situation being
contemplated at the time, namely targetting (Hood 1983). Collibration is, firstly,
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an intervention in an ongoing dynamic process, and such a process may well
be affected not only by random ephemeral changes in the properties of the
participants and in the social setting, but also by long-term trends which need
not be smooth but could be catastrophic - a small change at some point sudden-
ly triggering off a large effect. Even if an intervention (canalizing or biasing)
were successful in shifting the point of equilibrium in the desired direction,
it is unlikely that one could so fine-tune it as to predict the exact distance - that
is, for example, how much the balance of power would change, or how much
the various interests would be affected.
Collibration is, secondly, an intervention into a social arena where one tension
is highly likely to be connected and interwoven with other social tensions, even
in other arenas and networks; an intervention, though successful in the arena
for which it is intended, may have unintended and more or less unpredictable
repercussions on other arenas.
In short, it is difficult to aim this particular government weapon. One can point
it in a desired direction but not very surely at a precise target. Its disadvantage,
then, is its low targetability, which is the other side of its advantage in requiring
only low specifiability. Since in any case the limits of collibration, as already
noted, are usually rather narrow before stability is endangered, the obvious
tactic is an incremental one: a little at a time, let it settle, see whether another
touch is required.
These characteristics suggest some of the conditions under which another form
of intervention is indicated. If the government wants or the situation demands
prompt or specific or closely-aimed measures, it will not choose collibration
unless that is all that is left.
Where all else is equal, however, collibration is likely to be a cheaper alternative
than unilateral regulation, or even than delegating discretionary control to a
"peak association" or the like, for its policing costs are also shifted to the actors
themselves. In that sense, although its programme effectiveness is circumscribed
and uncertain, its cost effectiveness in value-for-money terms is high.
4.4 Is collibration a phenomenon of its age?
In one sense, all that is new about collibration is the name. As was noted in
Section 1, rulers have from time immemorial taken advantage of conflicts be-
tween their peers, or between their mighty subjects, and leant one way or the
other as suited their own ends. Some "peers" are now multinational corpora-
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tions rather than other sovereigns, and some "subjects" now wield not lordly
might but collective strength, as with unionized workers and organized con-
sumers and associations of all kinds; and the policy instruments to hand are
contemporary ones. Yet, it may be thought, the principles remain the same.
But the "ruler" has changed: and the culture has changed. In the international
negotiations over Videotext standards in the late 1970s and 1980s Metternich
might have felt quite at home, as the French allied with the Canadians in order
to keep the British out, only to be thrown into disarray by the entry of the
Americans (Schmidt/ Werle 1992: 323). But the government representatives
present were representing not sovereign dynastic or territorial interests but the
standard adopted by their own major manufacturer, and no Metternich mate-
rialised to catalyze the ordering. Within the state, even the "post-modern" pic-
ture of a reinvented government on a summit, "steering not rowing" (Osborne/
Gaebler 1992), disposing, fostering and encouraging sectoral self-control through
peak associations and other multi-organizations, is incomplete without the
image of government also down where the action is, not even amongst the
tycoons but networking with middle management, playing a rather less exalted
but potentially more effective role.
The IT revolution, coupled with vertical and horizontal integration in industry,
coupled also with widespread disappointment at the performance of govern-
ments in the face of what Rapaport called "burgeoning megatechnology, increas-
ingly potent pharmaceuticals, and massive ecological interventions" (Rapaport
1986: 221), has led to a more realistic evaluation of the standing of the state
in social ordering, that of a node in a network; so that major "private" actors,
once united only in opposition to state "interference", now use the state only
for what they see it alone can do, and for the rest, bargain amongst themselves.
Anything the state does in this position, to protect its own institutional interests
or to discharge its wider and higher responsibilities to the nation, is much more
like a collibration than an act of sovereign power.
In terms of cultural theory, deriving from Mary Douglas’ celebrated "group
and grid" model (Douglas 1982), the formal role of government in advanced
industrial countries, as evidenced in Reaganomics and Thatcherism, is the con-
comitant of a massive cultural shift of popular mood from hierarchism to indi-
vidualism, from procedural rationality to substantive rationality (Thompson
et al. 1990; Schwartz/ Thompson 1990). But a second massive shift is becoming
daily clearer: from both hierarchism and individualism to egalitarianism, to
"green" types of global awareness, to critical rationality, to the enhanced sensi-
tivity that lies behind "politically correct" silliness, to distrust of authority. In
such a culture, the traditional forms of government intervention, so largely
predicated upon mass routine compliance with governmental pronouncements,
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either work very uncertainly or are ever more costly in enforcement. Collibra-
tory methods will grow increasingly important, as governments discover that
they are well adapted to this change in culture.
In these senses, collibration, however ancient its lineage, may be a phenomenon
of the age we seem to be entering.
4.5 Does collibration travel well?
What this question asks is twofold: whether the conditions for collibration are
found equally fully in all countries, and whether the habitual institutions and
conventions of a particular country (Lehmbruch’s "country-specific empirical
regularities" - 1991: 162) enjoin a characteristic style of operation. The question
obviously cannot be answered empirically without much research. In theory,
the conditions - several major arenas of existing more-or-less permanent conflict
between opposed social groups or classes of group, more-or-less equal in
strength (singly or in combination), stabilising the societal system without con-
tinuous input of energy by government - are to be found in most advanced
industrialised societies with pluralist politics. That may exclude not only a large
number of developing countries and command-economy countries, along with
those emerging from that category in eastern Europe, lacking mature non-gov-
ernmental institutions, but also perhaps Japan and the "little tigers" of the Pacif-
ic rim, where constant government input is notable.
There may, however, be limiting conditions even in Western countries. Where,
for example, one social cleavage dominates all others, this inhibits the "natural"
sociative effects of "cross-cutting" conflicts and interdependence. Many states
manage to maintain a precarious unity even though riven by religious, linguis-
tic, or ethnic/nationalistic divisions; but this is likely to require pretty constant
attention by government just to keep the pot from boiling over. The smallest
action by government to try to bias such a conflict for a programmatic purpose
other than merely preserving order is likely to prove destabilising.
Such a situation exists in the nationalist/loyalist conflict in Northern Ireland,
where any hint that the government may move in one direction provokes im-
mediate extreme reaction from the opposite side - directed at the government.
Belgium and other linguistically divided countries show a similar hair-trigger
sensitivity, if perhaps less murderous. As is now quite evident in former Yugo-
slavia and in parts of the former Soviet Union, constant government pressure
was necessary there to suppress ethnic and nationalistic separatism and rivalries.
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Even where a social conflict is not a dominant one in a Western country, and
where continuous government input to preserve stability is not necessary, there
are some areas where a government may well hesitate to intervene between
organised interests and groups except in a conventional public order fashion,
and avoid giving any appearance of playing off one side against the other for
its own policy purposes: religion, racism, jingoism and xenophobia, sexual
politics, intergenerational tensions, and so on.
For the second part of the question, a few hints in the illustrations in this paper
might be followed up. Examples were drawn from the United States, Britain,
Germany and Sweden. Many American examples concentrated on harvesting
private regulation for public purposes, which is consonant with a backlash from
overjuridification and overegulation. Several British examples were consistent
with an abrasive but decentralized style of industrial relations, coupled with
a strongly neo-liberal ideology. The examples from Germany pointed to the
strong tradition of national-level "peak associations" expected to run their own
affairs. The Swedish examples were compatible with socially-responsible gov-
ernments and powerful centralised labour organizations. None of these institu-
tional backgrounds is found to the same extent in the other three countries,
which rather implies that collibration does travel well enough within its limits.
Starting rather from what is common to the four countries, the empirical evi-
dence indicates that "policy networking", with its consequences for the nature
of the government role, is a well-established phenomenon at national and at
European levels. In terms of incidence, or numbers of actual occurrences, the
most frequent collibrations by far are in the categories of selective taxes and
remedial information, both fairly ubiquitous.
4.6 Is collibration subject to decay?
Does this mode of intervention contain the agents of its own destruction, as
(according to its critics) regulation is bound to result in "capture" of the regula-
tor by the regulatees, in goal displacement, in shift of focus from objectives to
enforceability, above all in stimulating the search for ways around?
The answer can only be "certainly". It is most likely that the effect of a collibra-
tion will be short-lived, and that if it is repeated often, it will destroy the condi-
tions of any original success.
A collibration is an intervention into a conflict process, with the intention of
leaving its structural causes in place; but the operational accidentals of the
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process, as distinct from the structure of the arena, are ephemeral and contin-
gent. The world may change. Bank Rate announcements in today’s world of
computerised international money-shifting have comparatively little effect on
their ostensive target, the domestic money markets, though they are more sig-
nificant in creating international confidence (or its negative) in the macro-eco-
nomic policy of the government, and the influence that may have on exchange
rates and balance of payments. Compulsory strike ballots are otiose when the
mood of trade unionists has moved away from confrontation altogether. Most
collibrations have a short half-life.
Actors may adapt. Food packagers exploit loopholes in labelling regulations,
private hire cars do not have to have fare meters, safety steward "whistle-blow-
ers" learn how to turn their powers to partisan advantage. Government may
"move the goalposts" but opportunist players will soon find ways of exploiting
the new rules, or of retaliating. To adapt the Goodin/ Galbraith remark quoted
earlier, as soon as collibratees discover they are being managed they cannot
be managed so effectively.
But the biggest cause of decay is routinisation. A financial injection into a weak-
er contestant meant to even up available resources, which is then regularly
repeated, becomes a commitment to subsidise with less and less reference to
the social dynamic. A handicapping of one group with a view to "levelling a
playing field", if kept in place unmonitored, becomes a mere regulatory activity
with no "balance" content. If the government, encouraged by initial success,
loses sight of the structural objective and indulges in further handicapping, this
effect may become reinforcing and lead to the death of the self-policing arena,
so that active governmental policing of the side left in possession of the field
has to be instituted. Something like this may have happened in British industri-
al relations.
Manipulations and canalizations are like diplomacy, which cannot be routinised
without risk to its purpose. Formalizing, the culturing of "peak" associations
in order to harvest for public policy purposes the self-regulation they engender,
is subject to another kind of decay. As with the king and his dukes and barons
of old, the problem becomes that of the sorcerer’s apprentice, how to keep in
control of one’s creation, how to prevent interests designed to be at loggerheads
from uniting together instead. This is the "trust" syndrome in manufacturing,
but is found occasionally in other sectors like health and education when all
infighting ceases in the face of common danger. When permitted by a careless
Minister (e.g. in the testing of fourteen-year-olds in British education), the Press
usually calls it "rebellion", though perhaps this should be reserved for cross-
sector common fronts.
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The "policy network" structure works against cross-sector horizontal interest-
aggregation, and "conglomeration" is as yet a mainly financial phenomenon.
But vertical interest-aggregation at European level, by-passing the national state,
is already here. The Commission encourages the growth of formally-organized
"peak associations" at the EC level, to represent their constituent interests collec-
tively rather than individually (Greenwood et al. 1992; quoted in Dang-Nguyen
et al. 1993: 5). These EIOs (European Interest Organizations) are still weak vis-à-
vis their national constituents, but arguably these institutions are stronger evi-
dence of European integration that the aspirations of the Maastricht Treaty.
4.7 Accountability and the audit trail
The ancient and medieval antecedents of modern collibration noted at the be-
ginning of the paper have not become extinct. Maxims like "divide and rule"
still have currency (both Franklin D Roosevelt and Francois Mitterand are said
to have lived by that strategy); words are still dropped into the right ears; and
highly "discretionary" behaviour still takes place at informal lunches between
representatives of government and tycoons of industry, commerce and the
professions. It is probably by association with that kind of thing that the notion
of "altering the balance of power", for example, is instinctively felt to be not
only a necessarily clandestine and sub rosa affair but also somehow illegitimate,
even unethical.
It is important to note, therefore, that although particularistic behaviour of that
kind occurs and can hardly be brought to account, the great bulk of the illustra-
tions of traditional collibratory activity described here required legislation, or
the making of a regulation under an enabling statute, or the commitment of
money accounted for in the normal way. If a requirement to put worker repre-
sentatives on the board of directors applies to a firm of a defined type it applies
to all firms of that type; if a restriction of picketing applies to one trade union,
then to all; and so on. Remedial information is either supplied by government
to everyone, or else is supplied through mandatory disclosure by actors covered
by the regulation requiring it. So the accountability channels are the same as
for any exercise of the regulatory or spending power.
The exceptions are the political "dirty tricks" like the "pork barrel". Everybody
knows it goes on, and not only in the United States; but since it is but a jour-
nalist’s name for actions that are usually quite legal and authorised in them-
selves (it is the intentions that make them "pork barrel"), they are either fully
accounted for in the ordinary way, or they are unaccountable except by political
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means - if it is too obvious, people will recognise they are being managed
(though they then may simply welcome their share of what’s going).
I do not therefore see any great difference, in the matter of an audit trail, be-
tween these collibratory interventions and other kinds of government interven-
tion. If we turn to the kind of activity described as "formalizing an arena" and
"networking" in Section 3, it is true that that is inherently less likely to leave
an audit trail; but in that, it is no different from many other kinds of essentially
diplomatic activity, which includes all negotiating. Public servants so engaged
may be able to point to a general power alleged to cover the activity; but the
true accountability lies only to colleagues and superiors who know what is
being attempted, and who will lay praise or blame according to their measure
of the difficulty of the task and of the skill with which it was tackled. Expendi-
tures are likely to be small; success will erase procedural shortcuts; failure will
usually mean quick forgetting, for the problem will still need attention. As with
other collibrations, the limits of choice are usually very narrow, and overambi-
tion is likely to be immediately punished with disaster.
4.8 Conclusion
We have been investigating a technique of government intervention that has
an ancient pedigree and many contemporary manifestations, yet has as yet no
type-label in common use. Our first aim was therefore to identify its characteris-
tics and the conditions and limits of its use, the circumstances in which it would
be appropriate, and any consequent problems. But the description and analysis
have pointed to a possibly even more interesting and surprising conclusion:
that this old technique of government intervention is one which, within its
limits, meets the emerging needs and specifications of politics in the mid-nine-
ties, one whose time has come anew.
Many segments of an advanced industrial society are self-policing: one group
can only achieve its aims at the expense of one or more other groups, who
therefore mobilise to keep it in check. Self-policing of this kind is, from most
governments’ point of view, a happy idea, except when the mutual antagonism
takes a course incompatible with the government’s own responsibilities to the
people, or with its ideological and other commitments; and sometimes one side
may look as if it were gaining the upper hand in a conclusive way, which
would bring the self-policing to an end unless they were somehow restrained.
These are the circumstances in which collibratory activity is indicated, to aid
one combatant or handicap another; conversely, they are the necessary (though
not the sufficient) conditions for successful collibration. They also imply the
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limits: any ill-judged compensatory move may trigger an escalation instead,
which will again destroy self-policing. Any policy tool can be employed in
collibration: information, regulation, subsidy, or direct physical action. It is the
intention which counts.
Some social conflicts are not self-policing; on the contrary, they take up a great
deal of government’s energies, to preserve public order, or to ensure national
economic development, or to restrain separatism, and so on. Collibration is not
an option in these conditions, which in practice may well obtain in most coun-
tries of the world today, so that optimum conditions are probably found only
in a handful of relatively-pluralist societies in Europe, North America and
Australasia.
The main attractiveness of collibratory methods to governments is that, other
things being equal, they give a cheap, non-committing and unobtrusive form
of intervention. There is often no need to specify standards or objectives, and
the executing energy is supplied by the rival combatants. The disadvantages
of collibration are its precariousness - things can easily go wrong; its low tar-
getability - it cannot be precisely aimed; and its rapid decay - it cannot be rou-
tinised. From the citizen’s point of view, it can pose problems of audit and
accountability; but no more, perhaps, than the diplomatic activity of govern-
ments, which in many ways it resembles.
It offers an alternative both to "hands off" government, to survival of the fittest
anti-interventionism, which is perceived by serious commentators to have failed
over the past decade; and to the centralised and bureaucratized statutory con-
trol to which that was itself a reaction. Yet it is definitely interventionist, and
positively so: not merely to establish a "level playing field" for great corporate
actors (in the spirit of the nineteenth century idealists - Green 1895), but to
"shift the goal posts" if that is necessary to discharge government’s wider re-
sponsibilities or electoral commitments. It is a technique not obviously repug-
nant ideologically to either conservative or social democratic parties.
In an emerging political culture where governments of all colours are commit-
ted to at least a measure of deregulation, disinvestment, and devolution of
executive tasks, where enforcement of authoritarian rules is in any case deeply
unpopular, and where "the state" for many purposes has shrunk to little more
than one "peak association" among many, a technique of government interven-
tion built upon the encouragement and maintenance of social self-policing and
self-regulation would seem to have a great future.
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